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whose belief system is compatible with several (possibly infinitely
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basis of a single aggregate prior via classical expected utility theory
(a psychologically plausible account of individual decisions).
We investigate this problem by first recalling some negative results
from preference and judgment aggregation theory which show that the
aggregate of several probability measures should not be conceived as
the probability measure induced by the aggregate of the corresponding
expected-utility preferences. We describe how McConway’s (Journal
of the American Statistical Association, vol. 76, no. 374, pp. 410–
414, 1981) theory of probabilistic opinion pooling can be generalised
to cover the case of the aggregation of infinite profiles of finitely-
additive probability measures, too; we prove the existence of aggregation
functionals satisfying responsiveness axioms à la McConway plus
additional desiderata even for infinite electorates. On the basis of the
theory of propositional-attitude aggregation, we argue that this is the
most natural aggregation theory for probability measures.
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1. Introduction
This paper studies the aggregation of infinitely many probability
measures. Depending on one’s disciplinary outlook, the question may be
either of interest in its own right or need further motivation. The rest of the
introduction and the following Section 2 is meant to provide such motivation;
these initial parts can be ignored by readers who find the problem of sufficient
interest in itself.
Formal epistemologists are now increasingly following the decision-
theoretic paradigm of recent decades by weakening the strict, classical
Bayesian assumption of rational agents being endowed with a single
subjective probability measure. (Subjective probability measures are
generally referred to as priors in the decision-theoretic literature, even when
learning by conditioning is very rarely studied, whence there are, strictly
speaking, neither prior nor posterior probability measures in the statistical
sense; we submit to this terminological convention.) Richard Bradley [3], for
example, entertains the possibility of rational agents having belief systems
that are compatible with several subjective probability measures — as
opposed to a single unique one. This appears, at first sight, to be a step
in the direction of the recent decision-theoretic literature on multiple priors.
However, this is not the case — due to the different perspectives of
epistemologists on the one hand and decision theorists on the other. There
are at least two ways in which the aggregation of probability measures per se
— as opposed to their induced preferences — is of great importance from
an epistemological point of view and perhaps also of some interest from a
decision-theoretic vantage point
The first comes from social epistemology. Consider a group whose
members hold different belief systems, each encoded by a subjective
probability measure, and face a collective decision, i.e. they need to choose
one of several social alternatives. Suppose this group wants to ensure that
their decision is rationally defensible given some belief system which in a
reasonable sense aggregates their individual belief system. Let us assume, for
simplicity, that the individuals differ only with respect to their beliefs while
sharing a common utility function over final outcomes. A good solution
to their problem would be to look for a way of rationally aggregating
the probability measures describing their individual belief systems and
afterwards choosing a social alternative which maximises expected utility
with respect to the aggregate probability measure. (Cases similar to this,
however with additional serious complications, feature in a forthcoming
paper by Bradley, Dietrich and List [4].)
Another area in which the aggregation of probability measures per se
becomes important is a new, epistemologically and psychologically informed
account of individual decisions. This account is motivated by theories
from contemporary psychology according to which the human mind is to
be understood as a composition of more elementary mental agents, viz. in
terms of a “society of mind” (Minsky [44]), a “multimind” (Ornstein [45]),
or an “internal family system” (Schwartz [50]); it has been formalised and
introduced into the epistemological discussion by Richard Bradley [3].
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Technically speaking, this new account of human decision making
attempts to give a precise description of the decision process of an individual
whose belief system is compatible with several probability measures:
Bradley [3] suggests that every decision of an agent with multiple subjective
probability measures is preceded by an “aggregation” of those priors — which
takes her, temporarily, to a new, aggregate prior, i.e. a new probabilistically
consistent belief system; in order to make a decision, she will then evaluate
the options available to her using the classical expected utility criterion with
respect to the temporary, aggregate prior.1 After the decision has been
made, she returns to her previous epistemic state encoded by a whole set of
subjective probability measures. Note that this set of subjective probability
measures will in general not be finite — e.g. when it is the set of all
probability measures that are consistent with certain conditional probability
assignments or that satisfy certain upper or lower bounds when evaluated
at certain events (“interval probabilities”). Therefore, epistemologists who
wish to follow Richard Bradley [3] in his proposal to integrate insights from
contemporary psychology into epistemology should seriously consider the
problem of aggregating infinite profiles of probability measures.
Of course, the classical decision theory for multiple subjective probability
measures (multiple priors), as in Gilboa and Schmeidler [18], is not — at least
not without substantial, quite probably philosophically questionable, detours
— applicable in these situations: Whilst one could associate each probability
measure in the set of priors with an individual and thereby view a maxmin
expected-utility preference ordering as an aggregate preference ordering, the
corresponding “aggregator” would aggregate preferences derived from priors,
not priors themselves. Therefore, this theory is — notwithstanding its
mathematical elegance and also in spite of its manifold practical use, e.g.
in mathematical finance (cf. e.g. Riedel [46]) — not satisfactory for the
epistemologically motivated purposes of the present paper.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 motivates the problem
of aggregating subjective probability measures from a revised Bayesian
perspective. This section can be skipped by readers who are only interested
in the technical aggregation problem itself, which will be studied in Section 3.
We will see that there is indeed a relatively natural and decision-theoretically
defensible way of aggregating probability measures — via a generalised
aggregation theory for infinite profiles of probability measures along the
lines of McConway [43] (and Arrow [2]). Moreover, this existence question
is not trivial, as certain natural candidates like oligarchic aggregation or
aggregation via integrals on the electorate are not feasible. The formal details
and proofs are given in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2. Motivation: Bayesianism with multiple priors
2.1. Single- vs. multiple-prior Bayesianism and decision theory.
In classical Bayesian contributions to epistemology and decision theory it
is often assumed that the degrees of belief of a rational individual can be
1An agent will always have several probability measures if her belief system
only entails a partial probability assignment, as for instance in Jeffrey’s “radical
probabilism” [29].
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given by a single probability measure: A rational individual, it is tacitly or
explicitly assumed in this literature, makes judgments about all propositions
in some algebra and does so by assigning a precise real number, its degree of
belief, to each of them. Let us call this thesis — for reasons which will shortly
become clear — single-prior Bayesianism. For philosophical simplicity, let
us also assume that all credences are reported explicitly by the individual,
rather than implicitly (through betting or the like).
Of course, this is a very strong assumption. To be sure, formal
epistemologists have offered numerous arguments why the degrees of belief
of a rational agent should satisfy the axioms of probability theory (at least
with finite additivity), if they are precise (e.g. Joyce [30], Easwaran and
Fitelson [14], Fitelson and McCarthy [17], Leitgeb and Pettigrew [37, 38],
Wedgwood [54]). These arguments, however, do not establish that the
system of propositions to which a rational agent assigns degrees of belief
must be an algebra, nor that a rational agent must always assign precise
degrees of belief.
Indeed, rational agents may subscribe to a set S of precise assignments
of conditional degrees of belief (i.e. assignments of real values to conditional
events 〈A|B〉, where A,B belong to some algebra A of propositions of which
the agent is aware) which is in general too small to derive precise degrees of
belief even for all propositions which occur in the conditional degree-of-belief
assignments in S. For instance, a rational agent may (for symmetry reasons,
say) assign a conditional degree of belief of 1/2 to proposition A given B,
but at the same time may not be able to assign a precise degree of belief to
either A or B. Instead, she would deem a whole, in general: infinite, set of
probability measures compatible with her beliefs. Let us denote the thesis
that the belief system of a rational agent corresponds to a set of probability
measures by multiple-prior Bayesianism.
Additional reasons for relaxing the assumption of single-prior
Bayesianism, i.e. that the beliefs of a rational agent can always be
encoded by a single probability measure, are provided by decision
theory. More than ninety years ago, F. Knight [33] already distinguished
two kinds of uncertainties to which economic agents may be subject:
Sometimes, economic agents are merely uncertain about the exact value of a
certain economic variable while being quite certain about the probability
distribution of that variable. This kind of uncertainty is called risk
or first-order uncertainty. But there are also situations in which the
economic agents do not even know the exact probability distribution of some
non-deterministic economic variable, but consider several, perhaps rather
different, probability distributions possible. This kind of uncertainty is
referred to as second-order risk or second-order uncertainty or Knightian
uncertainty and is empirically observable (cf. e.g. the famous Ellsberg
paradox [15]). Adopting the statistical terminology of prior and posterior
probability distributions, the phenomenon of second-order uncertainty is
sometimes also expressed by the term multiple priors or ambiguity (of the
prior).
For single-prior Bayesianism, there is an obvious decision criterion: An
act is preferable to another act if and only if the expected utility of the
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outcome of the first act under the single prior is higher than the expected
utility of the outcome of the second act. This is not only an intuitively
appealing, but also a particularly rational decision criterion in a rigorous
theoretical sense: The expected-utility theorems of de Finetti [8, 9, 10, 11],
von Neumann and Morgenstern [53] and, as a synthesis, Savage [49] show
that any preference relation among acts (i.e. maps from a certain set, whose
elements are called states of the world, to another set, whose elements are
called outcomes) which satisfies certain rationality postulates can be derived
from an expected-utility criterion for some probability distribution on the
set of states of the world and some utility function defined on the set of
outcomes.
2.2. Options for a Bayesian decision theory with multiple
priors. Among the strengths of single-prior Bayesianism — the thesis that
the belief system of a rational agent can always be adequately captured
by a single unique probability measure — is its association with a both
theoretically and practically very appealing decision criterion. But what
would be appropriate decision criteria under the hypothesis of multiple-prior
Bayesianism — i.e. the thesis that rational agents may have belief systems
compatible with several subjective probabiltity measures (“Knightian [33]
uncertainty”)? This depends, unsurprisingly, crucially on what we mean by
“appropriate” in this context. Two approaches have to be distinguished.
We might either conceive of multiple-prior Bayesian agents as rational
decision makers, whence “appropriate” reduces to a notion of decision-
theoretic rationality. If we were to choose that approach, we would look for
decision criteria that have some intuitive appeal and at the same time can
be rationalised in the same manner as the expected-utility criterion has been
rationalised by de Finetti [8, 9, 10, 11], von Neumann and Morgenstern [53]
and ultimately Savage [49]. (An additional criterion might perhaps be the
practical implementability of a decision criterion.)
Among the most famous results in this direction are the rationalisation of
the maxmin expected-utility decision criterion by Gilboa and Schmeidler [18]
and its generalisation to the decision criterion of maxmin expected-utility
with additive penalty (encoding the relative unlikelihood of certain priors)
by Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [42].
However, we might also look at our multiple-prior Bayesian agents
(agents who are subject to Knightian uncertainty) from a more
epistemologically motivated perspective. This is what Richard Bradley [3]
suggested in a recent colloquium talk. In line with some of the recent
psychological literature (for instance, Minsky [44], Ornstein [45], or
Schwartz [50]), Bradley conceives of multiple-prior Bayesian agents as
complex — in extreme cases schizophrenic — personalities, composed
of simpler sub-personalities (called “opinionated avatars” by Bradley)
corresponding to each prior that is compatible with the agent’s belief system.
When the time is ripe for a decision, the complex personality aggregates
(Bradley) her different probability measures into a single, temporary
subjective probability measure and then choose the optimal act based on
expected utility; after the decision has been made, she continues to be the
complex personality that she was before.
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In other words, on Bradley’s [3] account, the preferences of a multiple-
prior Bayesian agent (on which the decision is based) are not deduced directly
from her set of priors — as would be the case if the agent were to use
the maxmin expected-utility decision criterion. Instead, her preferences are
derived, at least for this specific decision, via classical expected-utility theory,
from a single, temporary subjective probability measure which has been
constructed using some aggregation rule from her set of priors — even though
the aggregation rule might vary, thus allowing for time-inconsistency. Hence,
at least from an epistemological perspective, the question now remains how
one can merge (‘aggregate’) probability measures; behaviourally, only the
aggregate prior is revealed.
3. The aggregation of probability measures
In principle, there are multiple possibilities for the ‘aggregation’ of several
priors into a single one. One’s choice will have to depend on how closely one
wants to follow some established notion of orthodoxy for aggregation.
If one were to take the requirement of an orthodox aggregation theory
very literally, one might recall that Arrow’s [2] aggregation theory is the
classical microeconomic theory of aggregation. Since its domain is the
aggregation of preferences, one would have to convert the priors first of all
into preference orderings; the canonical way to achieve this is via expected-
utility theory. This will then prompt the question under which circumstances
Arrovian aggregation of expected-utility preferences is possible.
One might even go one step further (than Bradley [3]) in the direction
of a society of mind (Minsky [44]) psychology of decisions: What if the
decision maker is composed of agents that are themselves conglomerates of
even more elementary agents who face some second-order uncertainty, yet
have very simple utility functions. Then, under some rationality constraints,
one may assume that each of the agents that constitute the decision maker
has maxmin expected-utility preferences or at least preferences from one
of the larger classes of ambiguous preferences, such as the variational
preferences of Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [42] or even the
MBA preferences introduced by Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni,
Marinacci and Siniscalchi [6]. The above question then becomes whether
Arrovian aggregation of such generalisations of expected-utility preferences
is possible.
As it turns out, this is in general not the case: Whenever one wants to
aggregate a profile of variational preferences from a sufficiently rich class (e.g.
the set of all expected-utility preferences for some set of states of the world or
the set of all multiple-prior preferences) into a single variational preference
ordering (e.g. an expected-utility preference ordering on that set of states
of the world), there will be no aggregation rule satisfying the analogues of
Arrow’s responsiveness axioms, as was shown in Herzberg [23, 22]. Note
that these impossibility statements can be established both for the case
of profiles of a given finite length (the analogue of Arrow’s [2] theorem)
and for the case of profiles of any given infinite length (the analogue of
Campbell’s [5] theorem), using a model-theoretic approach to aggregation
theory inspired by Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [35] and systematically
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elaborated by Herzberg and Eckert [25, 26]. For the special case of the
Arrovian finite expected-utility profiles of a given length, this impossibility
theorem was proved by Le Breton [36]; an impossibility theorem for the non-
dictatorial aggregation of expected-utility preferences in a slightly different,
yet still very natural setting was established by Hylland and Zeckhauser [27].
Thus, one will have to relax somehow the requirement of following a well-
established orthodoxy regarding aggregation. Another approach becomes
available as soon as one recalls that the problem of merging several priors
into a single prior has actually already been studied in the statistical
literature: under the heading of probabilistic opinion pooling, in particular
McConway’s [43] characterisation of aggregation (pooling) rules satisfying
certain responsiveness axioms as linear averaging rules. (McConway’s [43]
findings have also entered the literature on aggregating expert judgments,
e.g. Cooke [7]; the aggregation of probability distributions, yet without
the imposition of Arrovian responsiveness axioms, has been studied by
Lindley [39].)
Even though McConway has shown a possibility result and Arrow an
impossibility result, the responsiveness axioms for pooling rules imposed
by McConway [43] are remarkably similar to those of the Arrovian [2]
social choice literature. In fact, based on these similarities, Dietrich and
List [13, 12] have formulated a unified framework for preference aggregation,
probabilistic opinion pooling and judgment aggregation. Herzberg [24] has
proposed a unified mathematical methodology for approaching this novel
general aggregation theory of Dietrich and List [13, 12]; in this setting,
one can derive both McConway’s [43] theorem and a judgment-aggregation
analogue of Arrow’s theorem [2] from a single characterisation theorem has
been proposed in Herzberg [24]. The basic idea is that in a binary setting,
there are fewer aggregation rules anyhow, whence the responsiveness axioms
can only be satisfied by aggregation ruler that are projections, while in the
probabilistic setting, the space of possible aggregation rules is much larger
and analogous responsiveness axioms can be satisfied by linear aggregation
rules.
Understandably, the probabilistic opinion pooling literature is only
concerned with finite sets of (σ-additive) priors. Since the set of priors
of multiple-prior Bayesian agents (agents facing Knightian uncertainty) will
in general be infinite sets of finitely-additive priors, we are looking for an
appropriate generalisation of McConway’s theorem. Our desideratum is a
theorem which proves the existence of aggregation rules for infinite profiles
of priors that satisfy Arrow’s responsiveness axioms.
In fact, it is not too difficult to give such an existence proof, at least
if one does not insist on the σ-additivity of the aggregate prior (which also
permits to study the aggregation of profiles of finitely-additive probability
measures).
We adopt essentially the same setup as in McConway [43], with
three modifications. First, no σ-additivity is required of the probability
measures. Secondly (WSFP, SSFP, or ZPP) consensus functions are now
called (independent, systematic, or unanimity-preserving — respectively)
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aggregation functionals, in order to connect the result to general aggregation
theory. Thirdly and most importantly, we allow for an infinite electorate N .
In the remainder of the paper, we shall discuss the framework just
described (including the assumptions on the aggregation operators) and
prove the following results, assuming that the underlying set of states of
nature has at least three elements:
(1) An aggregation functional is systematic if and only if it is both
independent and unanimity-preserving.
(2) If the electorate is finite, then an aggregation functional is
systematic if and only if the aggregation functional can be reduced
to weighted averaging of probabilities.
(3) If the electorate is infinite, then there again exist aggregation
functionals that are systematic but cannot be derived from the
probability assignments of any finite subset of the electorate.
(4) The existence of such aggregation functionals is non-trivial because
an obvious class of candidates for such aggregation functionals, viz.
integrals with respect to a σ-additive measure on the (power-set of
the) electorate, generically is empty if N is uncountable.2
Thus, non-trivial systematic aggregation of priors is possible even for
infinite electorates. Parts 1 and 2, of course, are merely a straightforward
adaptation of McConway’s famous results [43, Theorems 3.2 and 3.3] to a
setting in which σ-additivity of priors is not assumed and which also admits
with profiles of infinite length.
For part 3 of the Theorem, one has to find systematic aggregation
functionals for infinite profiles of priors, which have hitherto not been
constructed. Our construction uses Robinson’s [47, 48] nonstandard analysis
through an ultrapower of the reals with respect to some non-principal
ultrafilter on the cardinality of the set of priors (i.e. the profile length).
Very roughly speaking, the ultrafilter can be seen as a device of picking
an accumulation point of a bounded sequence (such as the profile of all
probabilities assigned to a particular event by individuals in the electorate),
and the use of nonstandard analysis permits (a) calculating with this
accumulation point as if it were an ordinary sequence element (i.e. just an
ordinary real between 0 and 1), and (b) extracting accumulation points in
a uniform manner for all sequences (i.e. all profiles of probabilities). In
particular, this construction satisfies only a weak anonymity concept, viz.
finite anonymity, but not bounded or even strong anonymity, as was shown
by Fey [16].
Part 4 merely assembles various results from axiomatic set theory on
the so-called measure problem. The problem with integral-based aggregation
functionals is that the function i 7→ Pi(A) which assigns to each individual
i the subjective probability of i for a given event A, given some profile P ,
need not be measurable with respect to a fixed σ-algebra on an uncountable
electorate N . In general, it can only be assumed to be measurable with
respect to the power-set σ-algebra. However, the existence of σ-additive
probability measures on the power-set of an uncountable set N is an intricate
2I am very grateful to the Associate Editor for the suggestion to look at this question.
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set-theoretic problem; the existence of such a measure cannot be proved in
classical mathematics and for some cardinalities of N even refuted.
4. A generalised aggregation theory for probability measures à la
McConway and Arrow
The possibility of aggregating finitely many probability measures while
satisfying responsiveness axioms similar to Arrow’s [2] has been known for
more than three decades: Any rule which takes the weighted average of the
individual probability measures already has those desirable properties, and
there are no other rules satisfying those desiderata (McConway [43]).
What has not been treated in the existing literature — at least to
the present author’s knowledge — is the aggregation of infinitely many
probability measures. We will now show that one can aggregate an infinite
number of subjective finitely additive probability measures in a manner that
satisfies McConway’s [43] Arrovian responsiveness axioms. It is enough
to form an ultrapower of the sequence of the subjective finitely additive
probability measures, with respect to an ultrafilter over the infinite set of
individuals, and then push it down to a standard finitely additive probability
measure by composing it event-wise with the standard part operator (as in
the Loeb [40] measure construction, but without requiring σ-additivity and
thus without invoking a saturation principle).
4.1. Formal framework. In the following, we present a framework for
probabilistic opinion pooling which is very similar to that of the classical
paper by McConway [43]. Our framework is more general in that it allows
for infinite electorates as well (and is concerned with the aggregation of
finitely additive probability measures). Our terminology reflects the formal
similarities between judgment aggregation and probabilistic opinion pooling
which have already been observed by Dietrich and List [13] (for a more
formal treatment, see Herzberg [24]).
Let Ω be a set of possible worlds and let Σ be the set of all algebras
on Ω.3 For all A ∈ Σ, let ∆(A) be the set of finitely additive probability
measures defined on A.
Let N be a finite or infinite set, called the electorate. An aggregation
functional is a map F with domain Σ such that F (A) : ∆(A)N → ∆(A)
for all A ∈ Σ. (McConway [43] calls our aggregation functionals “classes
of consensus functions”, denoted by C.) Elements ∆(A)N (for any A ∈ Σ)
are called profiles and are typically denoted P . Given some profile P =
(Pi)i∈N ∈ ∆(A)N (for any A ∈ Σ), we denote by P (A), for any A ∈ A,
the sequence (Pi(A))i∈N ∈ [0, 1]N . Furthermore, we denote by 0 and 1 the
N -sequences consisting only of 0’s and 1’s, respectively. Note that whenever
A 6= B, ∆(A)∩∆(B) = ∅ and therefore the domains of F (A) and F (B) are
disjoint. We shall therefore usually drop the first argument, writing F (P )
instead of F (A) (P ) for all A ∈ Σ.
3One could simplify the framework, in departure from McConway’s [43] original
paper, by just considering a single algebra, thereby ensuring that all aggregation
functionals have the same domain. Since all algebras are, up to isomorphism, subalgebras
of power-set algebras (due to Stone’s [51] representation theorem), this framework would
be less general than ours.
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4.2. Properties of aggregation functionals. A very natural
condition on any aggregation functional (“class of consensus functions”) is the
unanimity preservation principle (in McConway’s [43] terminology: “Zero
Probability Property”), which demands that the aggregate probability of
some event should be zero if all voters assign zero to it:4
Definition 1. An aggregation functional F is unanimity-
preserving/ZPP if and only if for all A ∈ Σ, P ∈ ∆(A)N and A ∈ A, one
has F (P ) (A) = 0 whenever Pi(A) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Another natural, but perhaps somewhat less compelling condition is to
demand that the aggregate probability of some event should depend on
nothing else than that event and the sequence of probabilities assigned to
that event by the voters (in McConway’s [43] terminology: “Weak Setwise
Function Property”):
Definition 2. An aggregation functional F is independent/WSFP if
and only if there exists a function G :
(
2Ω \ {∅,Ω}) × [0, 1]N ∪ {(∅, 0)} ∪
{(Ω, 1)} → [0, 1] such that for all A ∈ Σ, P ∈ ∆(A)N and A ∈ A,
(1) F (P ) (A) = G (A,P (A)) .
The independence property can be traced back to the Arrovian
literature where it appears as the requirement of “independence of irrelevant
alternatives”. In the judgment aggregation literature, it is commonly known
as independence tout court. The idea is that the social judgment with
respect to some proposition (encoding, e.g., a preference of one alternative
over another) should only depend on the individuals’ attitudes towards that
particular proposition. Of course, such a requirement is only plausible if
the agenda admits some kind of separability, so that the propositions about
which social judgments are formed enjoy some degree of mutual independence
themselves.
It is clear that G(Ω, 1) = 1 and G(∅, 0) = 0 whenever G satisfies
Equation (1) for some aggregation functional F (because F (P ) is, by
assumption on F , always a finitely-additive probability measure). Moreover,
the extension of the notion of independence/WSFP would not change if one
replaced the domain of G by 2Ω × [0, 1]N . This, however, would introduce
additional notational difficulties in the proof.
Finally, an even stronger notion than independence would be to require
that the aggregate probability of some event should depend on nothing else
but the sequence of probabilities assigned to that event by the voters (in
McConway’s [43] terminology: “Strong Setwise Function Property”):
Definition 3. An aggregation functional is systematic/SSFP if and
only if there exists a function f : [0, 1]N → [0, 1] such that for all A ∈ Σ,
4An alternative name for this concept might be the Pareto principle. However, the
Pareto principle is commonly associated with aggregation of preferences as opposed to
beliefs. (Even though one might argue that aggregation of probabilistic beliefs cannot be
separated from aggregation of utilities, cf. Hylland and Zeckhauser [27].) The desideratum
of unanimity preservation is applicable to epistemic as well as economic aggregation
problems.
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P ∈ ∆(A)N and A ∈ A,
(2) F (P ) (A) = f (P (A)) .
The notion of systematicity is known in the preference aggregation
literature as “neutrality”. It can be seen as stronger version of independence,
demanding that aggregation procedures be blind to the content of the
proposition about which individual judgments are aggregated.
From the judgment aggregation literature, it is well-known that for
sufficiently complex agendas, systematicity and indepencence are actually
equivalent (for a consise proof, cf. e.g. Eckert and Klamler [32]). A similar
finding holds in the setting of McConway’s [43] probabilistic opinion pooling.
This result of McConway’s [43, Theorem 3.2] can easily be generalised to
infinite electorates, as follows. (Because the original proof is only for finite
electorates and contains several misprints, we shall provide a full proof, even
though it is very close to McConway’s.)
Theorem 4 (“Unanimity-preservation & Independence =
Systematicity”). Suppose card(Ω) ≥ 3. Then, an aggregation functional is
both unanimity-preserving/ZPP and independent/WSFP if and only if it is
systematic/SSFP.
4.3. Existence and characterisation of aggregation functionals.
For the formal statement of our main theorem, we need the notion of an
oligarchy, which is a finite subset of an infinite electorate which uniquely
determines the aggregation functional by means of weighted averaging.
Definition 5. An aggregation functional is an oligarchy if and only if
there exists a finite proper subset M ⊂ N and some function h : [0, 1]M →
[0, 1] such that F (P )(A) = h
(
(Pi(A))i∈M
)
for all A ∈ Σ, P ∈ ∆(A)N and
A ∈ A.
Beyond non-oligarchy, the stronger notion of finite anonymity is a
desirable property of aggregation functionals for infinite electorates:5
Definition 6. An aggregation functional is finitely anonymous if and
only if for each permutation pi : N → N that is constant on a co-finite subset
of N , one has F (P )(A) = F
((
Ppi(i)
)
i∈N
)
(A) for all A ∈ Σ, P ∈ ∆(A)N
and A ∈ A.
If there exists some probability measure µ on the whole power-set of
N , then i 7→ Pi(A) will be a bounded measurable function for all A ∈
Σ, P ∈ ∆(A)N and A ∈ A. Hence one may define in such a setting a
systematic/SSFP aggregation functional by F (P )(A) =
∫
N Pi(A)µ(di) for all
A ∈ Σ, P ∈ ∆(A)N and A ∈ A. The existence of such a µ, however, becomes
a profound set-theoretic problem if N is uncountable. The consequence of
this will be seen in the subsequent characterisation theorem for aggregation
functionals. Let us, for simplicity, call aggregation functionals continuous
linear if and only if they admit an integral representation of the above form.
5I thank the Associate Editor for suggesting this.
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Definition 7. An aggregation functional is continuous linear if and only
if there exists a σ-additive measure µ : 2N → [0, 1] such that for all A ∈ Σ,
P ∈ ∆(A)N and A ∈ A,
F (P )(A) =
∫
N
Pj(A)µ(dj).
Remark 8. Any continuous linear aggregation functional is
systematic/SSFP.
Lemma 9. If N is countably infinite, then no continuous linear
aggregation functional is finitely anonymous.
Theorem 10 (Existence of systematic aggregation functionals). Suppose
card(Ω) ≥ 3.
• If N is finite, then an aggregation functional F is systematic/SSFP
if and only if it is continuous linear, and there exist non-oligarchic
aggregation systematic/SSFP functionals.
• If N is countably infinite, there exist non-oligarchic aggregation
functionals that are continuous linear, but also non-oligarchic
systematic/SSFP aggregation functionals that are finitely
anonymous.
• If N is uncountably infinite, then there exist aggregation functionals
that are systematic/SSFP, finitely anonymous and non-oligarchic.
• If N is uncountably infinite, the existence of finitely anonymous0
continuous linear aggregation functionals cannot be proved from
Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice (ZFC).
• If the cardinality of N is the least uncountable cardinal (or any other
successor cardinal), there cannot be a continuous linear aggregation
functional.
The proof follows from the following two lemmas in combination with
known results from axiomatic set theory. The first lemma is just a slight
variation of McConway’s [43, Theorem 3.3].
Lemma 11. If N is finite, then an aggregation functional F is
systematic/SSFP if and only if there exists some α ∈ [0, 1]N such that
F (P )(A) =
∑
i∈N αiPi(A) for all A ∈ Σ, P ∈ ∆(A)N and A ∈ A.
Lemma 12. If N is infinite, then there exist aggregation functionals
that are systematic/SSFP and finitely anonymous, but neither oligarchic nor
continuous linear.
5. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 4. First consider a systematic/SSFP aggregation
functional F , and let f : [0, 1]N → [0, 1] be such that for all A ∈ Σ and every
A ∈ A, Equation (2) holds. Trivially, it is then independent/WSFP. In order
to see that it is also unanimity-preserving/ZPP, it is enough to prove that
f (0) = 0. However, again by Equation (2), for any A ∈ Σ and P ∈ ∆(A)N ,
f (0) = f (P (∅)) = F (P ) (∅)= 0,
0Corrected after publication.
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wherein the first equality holds because each Pi is a finitely-additive
probability measure and hence Pi(∅) = 0 for all i ∈ N , and the last equality
holds because F (P ) is a finitely additive probability measure by definition
of F .
Now consider an aggregation functional F that is both unanimity-
preserving/ZPP and independent/WSFP. Then there exists a function G :(
2Ω \ {∅,Ω}) × [0, 1]N ∪ {(∅, 0)} ∪ {(Ω, 1)} × [0, 1]N → [0, 1] such that
Equation (1) holds for all A ∈ Σ and every A ∈ A. Because F is unanimity-
preserving/ZPP, it is easy to see that we must have
(3) G(A, 0) = 0
for all A ( Ω. Let P with P (A) = 0, so that P ({A) = 1. Then, G({A, 1) =
F (P )({A) = 1−G(A, 0) = 1. Therefore,
(4) G(B, 1) = 1
for all non-empty B ⊆ Ω.
Consider now two sequences (ai)i∈N , (bi)i∈N ∈ [0, 1]N such that ai+bi ≤
1 for all i ∈ N . Since card(Ω) ≥ 3, there will be two disjoint non-empty sets
A,B ( Ω such that A ∪ B 6= Ω. Then, there will be a algebra A such that
A,B ∈ A and a sequence P ∈ ∆(A)N such that for all i ∈ N ,
Pi(A) = ai, Pi(B) = bi, Pi(A ∪B) = ai + bi.
Since F (P ) is a finitely additive probability measure on A by definition of
F , we will have F (P ) (A ∪B) = F (P ) (A) + F (P ) (B), so
G (A ∪B, (ai + bi)i∈N ) = G (A, (ai)i∈N ) +G (B, (bi)i∈N ) .
In the special case, (bi)i∈N = 0, we obtain, in light of Equation (3),
G (A ∪B, (ai)i∈N ) = G (A, (ai)i∈N ) .
Therefore (putting C = A ∪B), whenever A ⊆ C ( Ω,
(5) G(C, ·) = G(A, ·).
(This equation, and structural similar identities in the remainder of this
paper, should be understood as an equality on the intersection of the domains
of the left-hand side and the right-hand side.)
It is now easy to prove G(A1, ·) = G(A2, ·) for all A1, A2 ( Ω. If A1 and
A2 have a non-empty intersection, then G(A2, ·) = G(A1 ∩A2, ·) = G(A1, ·)
after applying Equation (5) twice (each time with A = A1 ∩ A2, once with
C = A2 and once with C = A1). If A1 and A2 are disjoint with A1∪A2 ( Ω,
then G(A2, ·) = G(A1 ∪ A2, ·) = G(A1, ·) after applying Equation (5) twice
(each time with C = A1 ∪ A2, once with A = A2 and once with A = A1).
If A1 and A2 are disjoint with A1 ∪ A2 = Ω, then there must be a proper
non-empty subset D of either A1 or A2. Without loss of generality, assume
∅ 6= D ( A1 Then, on the one hand, G(A1, ·) = G(D, ·) by Equation (5),
and on the other hand G(A2, ·) = G(A2 ∪D, ·) = G(D, ·) after noting that
A2 ∪D ( A1 ∪A2 = Ω and applying Equation (5) twice.
Therefore, if we fix any non-empty A1 ( Ω, we will get G(A, ·) = G(A1, ·)
for all A ⊆ Ω and we may define f = f(A1, ·). 
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Proof of Lemma 9. If F is continuous linear, say represented by some
probability measure µ on N , and N is countably infinite then there must
be two individuals i, j such that µ{i} 6= µ{j}. Any permutation pi that is
constant on a co-finite subset of N and satisfies pi(i) = j and pi(j) = i is a
counterexample to finite anonymity. 
Proof of Lemma 11. One can literally copy the proof of McConway’s
main result [43, Theorem 3.3], because that proof does not require the σ-
additivity of the probability measures in the profile. 
Proof of Lemma 12. Our proof employs Robinsonian [47, 48]
nonstandard analysis.6 Fix a non-principal ultrafilter U on N .7 Then, the
ultrapower RN/U will be a non-standard model of the real numbers. Let ◦
denote the standard-part operator on this model of the hyperreals.
Let A ∈ Σ and P ∈ ∆(A)N , and define a real-valued set function F (P )
by
F (P ) : A→ [0, 1], A 7→ ◦ [P (A)]∼U .
(Since each element of the sequence P (A) is between 0 and 1, the ultrapower
element [P (A)]∼U is a hyperreal between 0 and 1 by Łoś’s theorem [41],
whence its standard part ◦ [P (A)]∼U is well-defined and a standard real
number between 0 and 1.)
Now, each Pi is finitely additive, addition on the ultrapower RN/U
is defined representative-wise and ◦ commutes with addition of limited
hyperreals. Therefore, for all disjoint A,B ∈ A,
◦ [P (A ∪B)]∼U = ◦ [P (A) + P (B)]∼U = ◦
(
[P (A)]∼U + [P (B)]∼U
)
= ◦ [P (A)]∼U +
◦ [P (B)]∼U ,
whence the set function F (P ) defined above is finitely additive. Similarly,
◦ [P (Ω)]∼U =
◦ [1]∼U =
◦1 = 1,
whence F (P )(Ω) = 1. Hence, F (P ) is a finitely additive probability measure
on A.
We also need to show that F is not an oligarchy. Suppose otherwise,
so that there is some M ⊆ N and some function h : [0, 1]M → [0, 1] such
that F (P )(A) = h
(
(Pi(A))i∈M
)
for all A ∈ Σ, P ∈ ∆(A)N and A ∈ A.
On the one hand, one can show that h must be a linear weighted averaging
operation, simply by applying the first part of the theorem to the aggregation
functional F (M) defined through
F (M)(A) : ∆(A)M → ∆(A), P 7→ h ((Pi(·))i∈M) .
On the other hand, by our above choice of F , we have
(6) ◦ [α]∼U = h (α)
for all α ∈ [0, 1]N , in particular for all sequences that converge to zero in
a strictly decreasing manner. Let us insert such a sequence α. Since h
6For an introduction and comprehensive survey of nonstandard analysis, cf. e.g.
Albeverio, Fenstad, Høegh-Krohn and Lindstrøm [1].
7The existence of non-principal ultrafilters is a consequence of, though weaker than,
the Axiom of Choice, cf. Halpern and Levy [19]
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is a linear weighted averaging operation and all entries of α are positive,
h (α) > 0. However, since α is a null sequence, [α]∼U is an infinitesimal on
account of Łoś’s theorem, hence ◦ [α]∼U = 0, contradicting Equation (6).
We have to prove that F need not be continuous linear. Now, if N
is countable, then U cannot be σ-complete, and therefore the set function
χU defined on 2N is not a σ-additive measure, whence the aggregation
functional F does not admit a classical integral representation (and hence is
not continuous linear).
If N is uncountable, then U can at the very least be chosen in such a
manner that U is not σ-complete and hence F is not continuous linear: For
example, suppose that either there are no weakly inaccessible cardinals or
the cardinality of N is less than the least such cardinal. If U were σ-complete
on N , then it would induce a σ-additive measure χU on N , which contradicts
our cardinality assumption (cf. Ulam [52], Jech [28, p. 126, Theorem 10.1]).
Hence, unless the cardinality of N is extremely large, no non-principal
ultrafilter U can be σ-complete, whence F will not be continuous linear.
(Note, that the existence of weakly inaccessible cardinals cannot be proved
from ZFC, cf. Jech [28, p. 33].) In general, regardless of the cardinality of N ,
there will at least exist non-principal ultrafilters U which are not σ-complete
(and satisfy additional properties, cf. e.g. Kunen [34, Theorem 3.2]).
Finally, we have to verify that F is finitely anonymous. To see this, note
that if pi : N → N is a permutation which is constant on a co-finite subset
of N , then Ipi = {i ∈ N : pi(i) = i} ∈ U by our choice of U. As U is closed
under supersets, this means that for all β ∈ [0, 1]N , β ∼U
(
βpi(i)
)
i∈N , i.e.,
(7)
[
β
]
∼U =
[(
βpi(i)
)
i∈N
]
∼U
..
Now let A ∈ Σ, P ∈ ∆(A)N and A ∈ A, and put P ′ = (Ppi(i))i∈N . Then,
[P (A)]∼U =
[
P ′(A)
]
∼U
by Equation (7), hence F (P )(A) = F (P ′)(A) by definition of F . 
Proof of Theorem 10. • The equivalence follows from
Lemma 11. If the vector α in that Lemma is chosen to contain
only non-zero entries, the resulting aggregation functional is clearly
non-oligarchic
• If N is countably infinite, there are of course continuous linear
aggregation functionals, and whenever the measure that represents
such a functional has full support, the resulting aggregation
functional will be non-oligarchic. There will then exist a sequence
α ∈ (0, 1)N such that F (P )(A) = ∑i∈N αiPi(A) (convergent) for
all A ∈ Σ, P ∈ ∆(A)N and A ∈ A. (In particular, ∑i∈N αi = 1.)
However, Lemma 12 teaches that there also other aggregation
functionals which are non-oligarchic and systematic/SSFP.
• This follows from Lemma 12.
• The existence of a finitely anonymous continuous linear functional
entails the existence of a σ-additive measure on N which is
“nontrivial” in the sense of set-theoretic measure theory (cf.
Jech [28, p. 125, (10.1 iii)]), i.e. it does not assign positive mass
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to a singleton. This, however, implies the existence of a weakly
inaccessible — in fact, even of a measurable — cardinal (cf. Ulam
[52], Jech [28, p. 126, Theorem 10.1]). This, however, is not
provable from ZFC (cf. Jech [28, p. 33]).8
• Since no successor cardinal is weakly inaccessible, the above
argument shows that there cannot be a continuous linear
aggregation functional if N has successor cardinality.

6. Discussion and conclusion
Formal epistemologists who accept Knightian uncertainty (or ambiguity)
— i.e. the thesis that rational agents may have belief systems that are
compatible with several subjective probability measures (multiple priors)
— need to come up with a new account of how such agents will make
their decisions, as classical expected utility theory requires, of course,
a unique prior. The standard decision-theoretic literature (e.g. Gilboa
and Schmeidler [18]) treats Knightian uncertainty through axiomatic
rationalisation of generalisations of expected-utility preferences, but this is
clearly not satisfactory from an epistemological point of view, since there
are situations where decisions have to be rationalised with respect to an
aggregate belief system (as, for instance, in Bradley’s [3] psychologically
informed account of individual decisions, or in social epistemology, cf.
Bradley, Dietrich and List [4]). What is needed is a natural aggregation
theory for probability measures — ideally one that is applicable to infinite
profiles of priors.
While a number of obvious approaches (such as Arrovian aggregation of
expected-utility preferences or their generalisations) turn out to be barren,
there does exist a candidate for such an aggregation theory of (possibly
infinitely many) probability measures: We have proved an extension of
McConway’s [43] results on probabilistic opinion pooling, which can be
regarded as Arrovian [2] in spirit, as it relates to Arrovian social choice
theory through the unified general aggregation theory of Dietrich and
List [12, 13]. The existence of well-behaved aggregation functionals for
uncountably infinite profiles is non-trivial, since obvious candidates such
as integral-based aggregators quickly lead into (set-theoretic) measurability
problems. Moreover, the aggregation functionals that we construct for the
case of infinite electorates also satisfy a weak anonymity condition.
Now some readers might be concerned about the use of the ultrafilter
existence theorem and nonstandard analysis in the construction of the
aggregation functionals for infinite electorates. It may be reassuring to recall
that (i) any proof invoking nonstandard analysis can always be transformed
into a long standard proof; (ii) that the ultrafilter existence theorem is
strictly weaker than the Axiom of Choice (Halpern and Levy [19]); and
(iii) that there are nonstandard models of the reals — even nonstandard
universes — which are definable over Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory plus
Choice (Kanovei and Shelah [31], Herzberg [20, 21]).
8If the existence of (weakly) inaccessible cardinals were provable, one could prove the
consistency of ZFC, violating Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem.
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To conclude: It is possible to directly aggregate — finite and infinite —
profiles of finitely additive probability measures in a way that (i) respects
Arrovian-spirited responsiveness axioms, (ii) reduces, in the case of finite
profiles, to the intuitive rule of linear averaging of probabilities, (iii) is —
for several decision-theoretic reasons — the most natural viable approach
to the aggregation of priors. Philosophically, this means that there is a
rigorous sense in which one can refer (1) to the ‘aggregate belief system’
of a group of individuals who hold probabilistic beliefs (as in Bradley,
Dietrich and List [4]) and (2) to the ‘aggregate prior’ of an agent whose
belief system is compatible with several subjective probability measures (as
recently suggested by Bradley [3]).
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